VickreyClarkeGroves auction - PDFSEARCH.IO - Document Search Engine

VickreyClarkeGroves auction
Results: 65

#	Item
31	Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English Game theory Mechanism design Distributed algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Strategyproofness Revelation principle Vickrey auction Agent-based model Incentive compatibility Algorithm VickreyClarkeGroves auction Multi-agent system
32	A Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler Department of Informatics, TU München, Munich, Germany , Add to Reading List Source URL: dss.in.tum.de Language: English - Date: 2015-07-06 06:27:57 Game theory Convex optimization Linear programming Operations research Mechanism design Expected value VickreyClarkeGroves auction Submodular set function
33	Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003 Add to Reading List Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04 Game theory Mechanism design Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Double auction Incentive compatibility VickreyClarkeGroves auction Algorithmic mechanism design Network formation Mathematical optimization
34	Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Sampling Bayesian-optimal mechanism Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Prior-independent mechanism Virtual valuation Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction
35	In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), ppAchieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges David C. Parkes Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-03-16 10:11:46 Game theory Auction theory Auctions Mechanism design Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Double auction Discounting Strategyproofness Payment VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
36	Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions Paul D¨ utting1,? , Monika Henzinger2,?? , and Martin Starnberger2,?? 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2013-09-29 17:50:14 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction First-price sealed-bid auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Valuation Revelation principle
37	Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp Language: English - Date: 2016-07-21 01:26:20 Game theory Mechanism design Auctions Auction theory Social choice theory VickreyClarkeGroves auction Combinatory logic Auction Strategyproofness Monotonicity Mode Norm
38	Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Social choice theory Algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Algorithmic Combinatorial auction Algorithm Auction Valuation
39	Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc., Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Virtual valuation Expected utility hypothesis Expected value Revenue equivalence
40	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013 Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:31:05 Auction theory Mechanism design Game theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Single-parameter utility English auction Revelation principle Spectrum auction